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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4325
This paper describes the index-based livestock insurance 
program in Mongolia designed in the context of a World 
Bank lending operation with Government of Mongolia 
and implemented on a pilot basis in 2005.  This program 
involves a combination of self-insurance by herders, 
market-based insurance, and social insurance. Herders 
retain small losses, larger losses are transferred to the 
private insurance industry, and extreme or catastrophic 
losses are transferred to the government using a public 
safety net program.  A syndicate pooling arrangement 
protects participating insurance companies against 
excessive insured losses, with excess of loss reinsurance 
provided by the government.  The fiscal exposure of 
Government of Mongolia toward the most extreme 
This paper—a product of the Financial Markets for Social Safety Net Department—is part of a larger effort in the department 
to develop effective and sustainable risk management and financial products for agriculture. Policy Research Working Papers 
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at omahul@worldbank.org. 
losses is protected with a contingent credit facility.  The 
insurance program relies on a mortality rate index by 
species in each local region.  The index provides strong 
incentives to individual herders to continue to manage 
their herds so as to minimize the impacts of major 
livestock mortality events; individual herders receive an 
insurance payout based on the local mortality, irrespective 
of their individual losses.  This project offered the first 
opportunity to design and implement an agriculture 
insurance program using a country-wide agricultural risk 
management approach.  During the first sales season, 7 
percent of the herders in the three pilot regions purchased 
the insurance product.  
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1. Introduction  
This paper presents the background and rationale for the Index-based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) 
project in Mongolia. The Government of Mongolia and the World Bank signed a loan for this 
project in May of 2005. The first sales occurred in 2006 to cover the mortality of livestock for the 
first five months of 2007. Sales were greater than anticipated with nearly 10 percent of the 
herders purchasing the insurance in the first year. Of more significance, financial intermediaries 
offering loans to herders provided lower interest rates to those herders purchasing this new form 
of insurance.  
The Mongolian countryside remains a herder-based economy.  Agriculture contributes nearly 
one-third of the national GDP and herding accounts for over 80 percent of agriculture.  Animals 
provide sustenance, income, and wealth to protect nearly half the residents of Mongolia.  Shocks 
to the well-being of animals have devastating implications for the rural poor and for the overall 
Mongolian economy.  Major shocks are common as Mongolia has a harsh climate where animals 
are herded with limited shelter.  From 2000-2002, 11 million animals perished due to harsh 
winters (dzud).  The government has struggled with the obvious question of how to address this 
problem. 
In 2001, Government of Mongolia (GoM) requested assistance from the World Bank to address a 
problem that has plagued Mongolia for centuries – tremendous death rates in the livestock 
population.  While the country had a social livestock insurance program during the communist 
period, several attempts to pass a livestock insurance law in recent years have failed. Based on the 
first involvement from the World Bank in 2001, Skees and Enkh-Amgalan (2002) recommended 
an index-based insurance program using mortality rates by species and soum2.  This 
recommendation was motivated by significant concerns regarding moral hazard, adverse 
selection, and extreme monitoring costs that would accompany a traditional livestock insurance 
program in the vast open spaces of Mongolia.  Another concern that was highlighted involved the 
potential for extreme loss exposure associated with any livestock insurance program in Mongolia. 
Since the initial recommendations to implement index-based livestock insurance, a significant 
policy debate within Mongolia has been occurring about alternatives for insuring and financing 
the extreme losses associated with the death of large numbers of animals.  Given the difficultly in 
finding solutions that would address both the social and market dimensions of this problem in a 
fashion that would not strain the state’s limited fiscal resources, GoM requested further research 
on this issue.  The policy recommendations reported in this paper are a product of conceptual 
developments that have been ongoing inside the World Bank on agricultural insurance and the 
research that has followed for the GoM. 
The core recommendations involve a combination of self-insurance by herders, market-based 
insurance and social insurance.  Herders retain small losses, larger losses are transferred to the 
private insurance industry, and extreme or catastrophic losses are transferred to the GoM using a 
public safety net program.  Given that this is a novel approach to a significant problem in 
Mongolia, the GoM was persuaded to begin a pilot program.  
The proposed insurance program relies on a mortality rate index by species in a local region 
(sum).  The index provides strong incentives to individual herders to continue to manage their 
herds so as to minimize the impacts of major livestock mortality events; individual herders 
receive an insurance payout based on the local mortality, irrespective of their individual losses. 
The insurance would pay out to individual herders whenever the mortality rate in the soum 
exceeds a specific threshold.  Finally, a 33 year time series on adult animal mortality is available 
for all soums and for the five major species of animals (cattle, horses, camels, sheep and goats).  
                                                          
2 In Mongolia a soum is equivalent to a county and an aimag is equivalent to a state or province.  
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Such data are critical for developing actuarial information and for understanding the potential 
cost of alternative designs. 
The large losses reported during 1999-2002 clearly demonstrated that Mongolian livestock is 
exposed to catastrophic risk and that the potential losses are well beyond the financial capacity of 
the Government and the domestic insurance market.  The new insurance law, passed in 2004, was 
an important step to strengthen the insurance industry through improved regulation and also 
included a provision for introducing index based livestock insurance in Mongolia.  To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first time an insurance law explicitly recognizes index-based insurance 
as insurance.  Involving the insurance industry, operating on a commercial basis, has the potential 
to improve the sustainability of livestock insurance and contributes to strengthening the rural 
finance sector, which is a key element in the government strategy for rural economic 
diversification. 
It is believed that the index-insurance product can be effectively underwritten, although 
significant financial exposure for a nascent insurance market that has extremely limited access to 
global reinsurance markets remains a significant challenge.  Among the most novel aspects of the 
recommendations is the special financing facility established under this project.  A syndicate 
pooling arrangement offers some opportunity to reduce the exposure for any individual insurer.  
This special pre-paid indemnity pool also assures that herder premiums will be protected until 
time of loss and that this unique line of business will not create financial spread for other lines of 
insurance for the insurance companies.  Risks are layered out with insurers purchasing 
(unlimited) reinsurance capacity to a reinsurance fund that pays all herder losses beyond a certain 
threshold.  Given that such a reinsurance fund cannot be built up fast enough to cover an early 
extreme loss, a World Bank contingent loan is also available to cover the most extreme losses. 
This paper is organized as follows.  The country agricultural risk management model developed 
by the World Bank is described in Section 2.  Section 3 presents the risk assessment analysis of 
livestock mortality in Mongolia based on catastrophic risk modeling techniques.  Section 4 
describes the design of the Mongolian livestock insurance program.  The pilot study is detailed in 
Section 5.  Section 6 discussed challenges in the implementation and operation of the pilot 
project.  Finally, the key issues are summarized in the conclusion. 
2. Agricultural Production Shocks: Country Risk Management Approach  
Ex post funding by most governments in developing countries and international agencies has 
been seen as the only response to catastrophic losses.  However, this approach turns out to be 
ineffective, inefficient and insufficient.  A country agricultural risk management model is 
proposed, based on the experience of the World Bank’s Insurance for the Poor Program. Policy 
implications are derived from this model. 
2.1. Ex Post Funding: An Unsustainable Approach 
Historically, most governments have not taken much interest in ex ante management of natural 
disasters because of low perceived vulnerability levels and the fact that most severe hazards 
manifest themselves very infrequently.  In addition to this cognitive failure, there has been a 
willingness on the part of the international community to provide post disaster funding for 
vulnerable countries exposed to catastrophic events.  The World Bank alone has disbursed more 
than US$40 billion of emergency and reconstruction loans (ERL) over the last 20 years. 
As a consequence of underdeveloped domestic insurance markets and the lack of risk awareness 
or economic incentives to engage in ex ante risk management, governments generally adopt 
reactive approaches to natural disasters, relying on domestic budgets, including diversion of 
resources from other projects, and on extensive financing from international donors.  In fact, 
emergency funding for reconstruction from international donors has become a linchpin of some 
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governments’ strategies for funding disaster reconstruction which is often supplemented by 
emergency reconstruction lending programs from the World Bank and other multilateral 
development banks.  In addition, it is usually hard for the donor community to credibly enforce 
any pledges to reduce ex post assistance if ex ante mitigation measures have not been 
implemented because of the overriding humanitarian considerations once a disaster occurs. 
Ex post funding approaches are inefficient.  The lack of advance planning and resource allocation 
prevents funds from being immediately available after a disaster.  Multilateral assistance can take 
a long time to disburse.  As a result, the adverse social and developmental impacts of disrupted 
economic activity are far greater due to the delayed response.  In addition there are no appropriate 
economic signals under this approach and country risk, and hence contingent liabilities, can 
escalate to unsustainable levels. 
Ex post funding approaches are ineffective.  Resource allocation after a disaster may be ad hoc.  
Resources may be targeted on bureaucratic or political considerations, rather than directed to 
those expenditures and investments that are most likely to restore economic activity promptly.  
The diversion of limited fiscal resources away from development projects, creating high 
economic and social value added, to politically motivated low net return purposes can have 
considerable opportunity costs and long term adverse economic effects. 
Ex post funding approaches are insufficient.  Most developing countries face ongoing fiscal 
constraints.  The quantity of funds available for relief and reconstruction may be far off from 
what is needed, particularly in the aftermath of a disaster.  This leaves a substantial resource gap. 
A fundamental consequence of natural disasters is that they tend to have the greatest impact on 
the poor, usually located in rural areas, who are affected most by these adverse events.  Scarce 
multilateral resources, which could have been utilized for growth and poverty reduction goals, are 
thus diverted by catastrophes, or more precisely, by the lack of appropriate ex ante disaster risk 
financing strategies. 
This does not mean however that ex post disaster funding from donors and international 
development banks cannot play an important role in the country’s risk management strategy, but 
that over-reliance on this approach has major limitations in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and 
sufficiency.  The challenge is thus to build a comprehensive risk financing strategy where the role 
of market-based insurance and social programs are clearly defined. Having pre-defined rules that 
are tied to premium payments or fee payments for social programs may also mitigate inequities 
that may occur when political decisions must be about how to distribute large sums of emergency 
disaster aid, often arriving well after the disaster.  
2.2. Country Agricultural Risk Management Model 
By ensuring that sufficient liquidity exists very soon after a disaster, modern funding approaches 
can help to speed recovery, ensure the scarce government funds are well used and reduce the risk 
of moral hazard. In addition, catastrophe risk management can assist countries in the optimal 
allocation of risk in the economy, which may result in higher growth, better mitigation, and more 
effective poverty alleviation. 
The approach advocated by the World Bank is to develop risk funding solutions that would 
provide countries with strong incentives to engage in active risk management and thus over time 
achieve significant reduction in their growing vulnerability and risk exposures. Such a major 
turnaround however would require linking, at least to some extent, donors’ post-disaster 
rehabilitation and reconstruction grants and emergency loans from major development banks to 
progress achieved by countries in ex-ante catastrophe risk management. This approach also rests 
on the notion of leveraging the Bank’s emergency funding with that of international reinsurance 
and capital markets. Only by combining the funding capacity of donor countries, development 
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banks and global reinsurance and capital markets, would developing countries be in the position 
to adequately meet their demands for risk capital to fund economic losses inflicted by natural 
disasters. 
In the larger industrial countries, losses from natural disasters are typically funded through a 
combination of private risk financing arrangements and an efficient public revenue system relying 
on wide and deep taxation catchments. In the case of developing countries, which have relatively 
low tax ratios and ongoing fiscal pressures, funding sources for post disaster reconstruction tend 
to be more varied, with a strong emphasis on assistance from international donors. Multilaterally 
sourced infrastructure loans and relief aid from donor agencies are among the most common 
sources of such disaster funding. 
A number of developing countries exposed to natural disasters have a limited capacity to absorb 
economic shocks caused by such disasters, thus relying on external sources of funding. Due to 
agency and information problems, new external capital is usually more expensive than internal 
capital (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 1993). These frictional costs make the country risk averse to 
catastrophic events and increase the value of ex ante risk management strategies.3
The World Bank Insurance for the Poor Program has been developing a country catastrophic risk 
management model which is partly based on corporate risk management principles but also 
factors in key economic and social metrics such as government fiscal profiles, the living 
conditions of the poor, and investment in risk mitigation (Gurenko and Lester 2004, Mahul and 
Gurenko 2006). This risk management approach at the country level relies on the assessment of 
the country fiscal exposure when all the cost-effective risk mitigation measures have been 
implemented, the identification of potential funding gaps between damages sustained by the 
country and funds available, and the financing of these gaps through private capital markets, and 
World Bank lending instruments. 
This framework has been extended to natural disasters in agriculture (Goodwin and Mahul 
2004, Gurenko and Mahul 2004, Mahul 2005).  It can be broken down into five main pillars. 
Differentiating market-based insurance and social insurance.  The inherent lack of clarity 
regarding the objectives of the public intervention in agricultural insurance has contributed to its 
inefficiencies.  Social insurance, or the safety-net, aims at assuring a minimum level of 
economic security to all farmers, and particularly those involved in low profit activities.  These 
social objectives rely on wealth transfer instruments.  Market-based insurance is oriented 
toward viable business activities that generate enough profit to cover insurance premium.  These 
instruments, which are based on sound actuarial principles, should apply only to viable farms 
whose survival may be jeopardized by the occurrence of an insured event. 
Assessing agricultural production risks.  The existence of reliable and accurate long-term loss 
data series is a precondition for the development of any market-based product, as they are used to 
assess the future probable losses.  Individual farm data are almost always missing or unreliable. 
Consequently, loss assessment is usually performed using aggregate data.  This analysis based on 
catastrophic risk modeling techniques provides objective estimates of potential losses and 
captures the spatial correlation of losses caused by widespread events (e.g., droughts, floods, 
epidemics).  The following measures of loss can be estimated either from historical data or from 
losses simulated with probabilistic risk models: 
• Value at risk is the total loss exposure of the assets at risk. 
                                                          
3 In a perfect market where external capital would not be more expensive than internal capital, i.e., in the 
absence of friction costs, risk management would be irrelevant. 
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• Annual average loss (AAL) is the expected loss per year when averaged over a long 
period of time. 
• Probable maximum loss (PML) is the largest likely loss for a given return period, e.g., 
one in 100 year event (i.e., 1% frequency). 
Financing agricultural production risks.  Risk financing strategies deal with the remaining part 
of the risks that cannot be mitigated with cost-effective preventive measures.  They are financed 
through farmers’ self-retention, private financial markets, governments and international donors 
through an appropriate layering of risks (see Figure 1). 
• The bottom layer of risk includes high frequency (e.g., occurring once every five years or 
more frequently) but low consequence risks that affect farmers from a variety of almost 
independent risks.  In many cases, these losses are caused by inappropriate management 
decisions and are thus exposed to moral hazard and adverse selection problems. They 
must be retained by the farmers and financed by individual savings/credit. 
• The mezzanine layer of risk includes less frequent (e.g., occurring once to six times every 
30 years) but more severe risks that may affect several farmers at the same time (e.g., 
hail, frost).  The private insurance industry has demonstrated its ability to cover these 
losses caused by localized adverse events and commercial farmers have shown their 
willingness to pay for named peril insurance. 
• The top layer of risk includes low frequency (e.g., occurring once in 30 years or less 
frequently) but high severity risks.  These catastrophic risks are by definition not well 
documented and the probable maximum loss can be very large.  The cost of transferring 
these risks, i.e., the insurance premium, can be high compared to the annual average loss 
(e.g., five to ten times the AAL), making (re)insurance an inefficient risk financing 
mechanism.  In addition, farmers may be unwilling to purchase this insurance because 
they tend to underestimate their exposure to catastrophic risks (cognitive failure) and rely 
on post disaster emergency relief.  Governments usually cover these very infrequent 
losses through compulsory insurance programs or social disaster relief programs. 
Innovative financial products developed by capital markets, known as Alternative Risk 
Transfer (ART) instruments (e.g., catastrophe bonds, catastrophe options, contingent 
debt), may offer new risk transfer opportunities to the insurance markets and 
governments. 
Figure 1. Agricultural production risk layering 
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Government 
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Agricultural insurance pool.  Agricultural insurance pools can contribute to offering affordable 
and effective insurance coverage through an efficient and low cost distribution mechanism that 
allows them to retain part of the agricultural risks in the country.  They aim to act as a center of 
technical excellence to support insurers, ensure efficient local retention by pooling non-retainable 
risks, and get optimal pricing from reinsurers by providing a partly diversified portfolio.  Self-
insurance funds in Mexico (Fondos) offer a valuable illustration of these mutuality-type 
organizations among farmers (see Box 1).  Catastrophe insurance pools have also been 
established to help domestic insurance companies finance catastrophic property losses (e.g., 
housing and infrastructure losses) caused by earthquakes, floods or cyclones, and to gain access 
to international reinsurance markets.  The World Bank provided technical and financial support to 
the government of Turkey for the creation of the first ever catastrophe insurance pool in middle 
income countries, the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (see Box 2).  
Product development.  Index-based insurance is an alternative form of insurance that makes 
payments based on an index, irrespective of the individual losses. It allows the agricultural sector 
to transfer covariate production losses caused by widespread weather events (e.g., floods, 
droughts) or epidemics to financial and reinsurance markets. Index-based contracts offer 
advantages over traditional individual insurance (no moral hazard or adverse selection, low 
administrative costs, standardized product) but it exposes the contract buyer to imperfect 
indemnification, i.e., the possibility that the payout is different to the individual loss (basis risk), 
and relies on the quality of the data.  Table 1 summarizes the main tradeoffs to be considered in 
the selection of an effective insurance index.  Experiences in index-based insurance are multiple, 
but still remain marginal.  Area yield crop insurance, where the index is based on the average 
yield in a given geographical area, has been offered in India, Brazil, Canada and the USA (Skees, 
et al. 1997). Parametric insurance (e.g., rainfall insurance) has been offered in Canada, Mexico 
and India.  As described in the subsequent sections, a livestock mortality index insurance has 
been offered to herders in Mongolia since 2005. 
 
Table 1. Index effectiveness 
 Individual 
index 
Area-based 
index 
Parametric  
index 
Easily comprehensible Yes Often Yes 
Basis risk No Yes Yes 
Delays in claim settlement Sometimes Yes Rarely 
Moral hazard/adverse selection Yes Sometimes No 
Reliable data Rarely Sometimes Often 
Index manipulation Yes Rarely Sometimes 
Administrative costs High Low low 
Source: authors. 
 
Box 1. Fondos in Mexico 
Fondos are self-insurance funds that have been operating in Mexico since 1988. In 2004, more 
than 240 Fondos provided insurance against agricultural production risks (including hail, drought, 
frost, floods, diseases, pests) to their members, accounting for 50 percent of the total insured 
agricultural area in Mexico. The total liability of the Fondos on an annual basis was 
approximately US$$400 million dollars in 2004. They are mainly concentrated in agricultural 
areas with productive potential and financial viability. Subsistence and poor non-commercial 
farmers are supposed to be covered through the Government sponsored national disaster scheme 
FONDEN. 
According to Mexican laws, Fondos are non-profit organizations constituted by the farmers as 
civil associations without the need to provide any capital endowment, except their willingness to 
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associate between themselves. From a risk-financing perspective, Fondos pool crop yield risks 
from farmers with similar risk profiles. The concept of insurance through mutuality-type 
organizations was developed in Mexico based on a sound insurance market approach (including 
sound underwriting techniques, adequate financial reserves, loss adjustment procedures based and 
actuarially sound premium rates developed), while taking advantage of mutuality type 
organizational principles and a structure of incentives to keep transaction costs under control.  
The Fondos can not sell insurance to their members unless they have a proper reinsurance treaty 
negotiated before the beginning of any specific agricultural cycle of production. Since these 
organizations do not have capital to guarantee the solvency of the Fondos, they must buy enough 
reinsurance to guarantee that the members of the Fondo will receive the full amount of indemnity 
in the case of a peril (no default risk). The regulation requires that any reinsurance contract 
negotiated by the Fondos should be defined to absorb any exceeding indemnities after the 
financial reserves of the Fondos have been exhausted. Therefore, an unlimited stop loss 
reinsurance treaty is implicitly requested. Historically, the state-owned reinsurance company 
Agroasemex has offered to the Fondos this unlimited stop loss program. The Government 
supports also a training program to enhance the operations of the funds through Agroasemex. The 
training programs include technical aspects related to the underwriting and loss adjustment 
procedures, the development of new products, accounting, legal aspects, etc. 
Source: Ibarra and Mahul (2004). 
 
Box 2. Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool 
In the aftermath of the August 1999 Marmara earthquake, The Turkish Government with  World 
Bank technical and financial support created the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP). The 
program operates as a catastrophic risk transfer and risk financing mechanism that limits the 
government’s financial exposure to future natural disasters by absorbing up to UD$ 1 billion from 
Turkish homeowners. Under the program, compulsory earthquake cover is introduced for all 
property-tax paying dwellings. 
The government aimed at creating a pool in which sufficient reserves could be accumulated over 
time, thus making Turkey less vulnerable to future earthquakes. The key objectives for the TCIP 
defined by the Government of Turkey were: 
- Ensure that all property tax paying domestic dwellings have earthquake insurance coverage; 
- Reduce government fiscal exposure to recurrent earthquake; 
- Transfer catastrophic risk to the international reinsurance market; 
- Encourage risk mitigation through the insurance mechanism. 
The World Bank provided the initial capitalization of the TCIP through a committed contingent 
loan facility of US$100 million, extended to US$180 million in 2004. Although the risk capital 
requirements of TCIP are much higher, they are funded through commercial reinsurance, in the 
amount of US$750 million, and the build-up of surplus. The disbursement of the World Bank 
facility would be triggered by occurrence of a loss, as evidenced by insurance claims from a 
major earthquake. The line of credit has now expired as the pool has now built up adequate 
internal reserves. 
The TCIP’s earthquake insurance is legally compulsory for many urban Turkish homeowners, 
although the compulsion is not well enforced. Local insurers act as distributors of the TCIP (they 
do not currently retain any fraction of TCIP’s earthquake risk), in exchange of a commission (15-
20% of written premium), and provide additional coverage in excess of that offered by the pool. 
Since its inception in 2000, the TCIP’s penetration ratio has averaged 17% but is now in excess of 
20%. 
Source: Gurenko et al. (2006) 
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 2.3. Policy Implications: Toward a Public-Private Partnership 
Governments, with the help of international institutions like the World Bank, can create an 
economic and legal environment that facilitates the emergence of a competitive insurance market 
and provides farmers with incentives to engage in risk financing strategies.  This should rely on a 
public-private partnership between the government and the domestic insurance industry to 
address the following challenges: 
• Data management. An efficient data management system is critical to the development of 
insurance products. It aims to (i) build accurate and complete historic databases and (ii) 
secure future data measurements from fraud and abuse. 
• Regulatory and supervisory framework. This framework is intended to ensure that (i) 
insurers have the financial resources required to pay all claims as they become due and (ii) 
insurers treat consumers in an equitable manner in all financial dealings. It is based on a set 
of rules that foster financial sector stability and public protection, while ensuring market 
competitiveness and efficiency. 
• Technical expertise. Agricultural insurance is a very technical field. At the top 
administrative level, it requires expertise in the design of the insurance scheme, the 
establishment of the terms and conditions of coverage, and the actuarial aspects of 
insurance. At the local level, there is a need for personnel who can explain agricultural 
insurance to the farmers and for personnel skilled in the functions of underwriting and loss 
adjustment. 
• Risk financing entity. Governments should only finance losses that cannot be transferred to 
the private market at acceptable costs. They should focus on catastrophic losses, acting as 
reinsurers/lenders of last resort, when the financial resources of the domestic insurance 
industry are scarce and the access to international reinsurance markets is limited. This 
temporary risk arrangement should allow insurance companies to build up reserves and to 
retain larger layers of risk over time. The resulting risk exposure of governments should be 
adequately financed through an appropriate country risk financing strategy including, e.g., 
reserve funds, reinsurance and contingent credit facilities. 
• Information and education. Information and education campaigns should be undertaken to 
reduce the widespread lack of insurance culture among farmers. 
 
3. Livestock Mortality in Mongolia 
3.1. Mongolian Livestock Sector 
The agricultural sector plays a central role in the Mongolian economy, contributing around one-
third of national GDP. The most important agricultural activity is livestock husbandry, which has 
over an 80 percent share of agricultural GDP and supports at least half the population. Livestock 
provides an important source of income, jobs and food security, and a means for households to 
invest and store their wealth. However, the country is prone to regular extreme climatic events 
that can cause high rates of livestock mortality, jeopardizing rural livelihoods. In particular, the 
frequent droughts and severe winters (known as dzuds) can devastate herds. During the period 
between 1999 and 2002, one-third of the national herd was lost in successive dzuds. 
The importance of livestock to the livelihoods of poor rural households has increased in recent 
years with the shift from collectivized farming to family-based herding during the 1990s. As a 
result of economic restructuring, the number of herding families doubled from 1990-1997, and 
 9
Mongolia’s overall herd size increased from 25 to 31 million, increasing the pressure on grazing 
resources. 
The Government of Mongolia has prioritized the livestock sector and, with support from donors, 
is responding to these disasters and introducing a program of sectoral reform. This includes 
greater flexibility in pasture land tenure, coupled with increased investment in rural infrastructure 
and services. A major thrust of government and donor intervention is the support for improved 
pastoral risk management. However these sectoral reforms and approaches are not sufficient in 
the face of catastrophic weather events. Although the State Reserves Agency works to mitigate 
the effects of dzud, when, due to extreme conditions, catastrophic livestock mortality arises there 
has been no insurance. Herders have to rely upon traditional informal coping mechanisms and ad 
hoc support from Government and international agencies. For affected areas, after immediate 
relief the main longer term support has been through restocking programs. Evaluation has shown 
that these can be expensive, relatively inefficient and fail to provide the right incentives for 
herders. Finally, restocking during a period where animals and pasture conditions are poor can 
actually increase livestock mortality in the following year.  
The management of risk in the livestock sector requires a combination of approaches. Pastoral 
risk mitigation can better prepare herders for moderate weather events. For dzud events, however, 
high levels of livestock mortality are often unavoidable even for the most experienced herders, 
and pastoral and herd management must be complemented by risk financing mechanisms that 
provide herders with instant liquidity in the aftermath of a disaster. 
Livestock insurance is a key element of risk financing. However, traditional individual livestock 
insurance (based on individual losses) has turned out to be ineffective in Mongolia: high loss 
adjustment costs due to the spread of animals over vast areas, ex ante moral hazard inducing 
herders’ failure to take all effective measures to protect their stock, ex post moral hazard leading 
herders to falsely report animal deaths are among the key endemic problems that plague 
traditional livestock insurance program in Mongolia. Monitoring individual herders in the vast 
territory of Mongolia is a nearly impossible task. Currently, the formal financial insurance 
products related to livestock mortality are unpopular among both insurance companies and 
livestock owners and are limited almost entirely to a small number of high value livestock. 
3.2. Livestock Losses 
After the livestock privatization of 1992, the number of livestock in Mongolia increased by 
17.5% percent, reaching 33.6 million by 2000. In the period 2000-2002, over 11 million adult 
animals died due to severe droughts followed by harsh winters (dzuds). In 2004, the size of the 
Mongolian livestock herd was approximately 23 million. The composition by species was 45% 
sheep, 38% goats, 8% cattle, 8% horses and 1% camels. 
Figure 2 shows the total losses faced by herders in Mongolia over the period 1971-2004, as a 
percentage of the total livestock value and as a percentage of 2004 GDP, estimated at US$1.4 
billion (World Bank 2005). Annual total losses are less than 8 percent of the total livestock until 
1999, and even less than 4 percent over the period 1994-1999. The years 2000-2002 show a 
dramatic increase in losses, reaching US$ 140 million (12% of the total livestock value) in 2000, 
and almost US$ 200 million in 2001 (17% of the total livestock value). The animal husbandry 
industry in Mongolia is thus exposed to macro exogenous shocks caused by adverse weather 
events. Such variability has negative effects on the growth of this industry which contributes one-
fourth of GDP and is important to the economic growth of the country. 
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Figure 2.  Livestock losses in Mongolia, 1971-2004 
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Source: National Statistics Office of Mongolia. 
 
An analysis of hazard frequencies and intensities is critical to assessing the country’s exposure to 
livestock losses. Risk assessment models provide a set of metrics, i.e., quantitative measurements 
of potential losses with respect to the frequency of the events. As shown in Table 2 and Figure 3, 
the value of the Mongolian livestock in 2004 is estimated at US$971 million. The average annual 
loss is US$ 46 million, i.e., 5 percent of the total value of the livestock and 3.3 percent of 2004 
GDP. However, the annual loss is highly variable, as a direct consequence of infrequent natural 
disasters, with a standard deviation estimated at US$ 36 million. Once every five years, the 
annual livestock loss would be US$ 53 million and this estimation goes up to US$ 143 million for 
catastrophic events occurring once every 30 years. 
 
Table 2. Livestock risk profile in Mongolia 
 US$, million Percentage of 
assets at risk 
Percentage of 
2004 GDP 
Assets at risk (2004) 971 - 61.1% 
Average annual loss 46 6.0% 3.7% 
Standard deviation 36 4.6% 2.8% 
PML (1 in 30 year event) 143 18.5% 11.3% 
PML (1 in 20 year event) 107 13.9% 8.5% 
PML (1 in 10 year event) 67 8.7% 5.3% 
PML (1 in 5 year event) 53 6.8% 4.2% 
Source: authors. 
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Figure 3. Livestock loss estimate - Exceedance probability curve 
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Source: authors. 
 
3.3. Livestock Mortality Rates 
The Government of Mongolia has been conducting an annual census of adult animals (cattle, 
sheep, goats, horses and camels) and the reporting of animal mortality for more than 50 years. 
This process is regulated by several laws and by-laws. Mortality rates, defined as the ratio of 
losses of adult animals in a given year to the census of adult animals the previous year, can be 
calculated for each species at the soum level over the period 1971-2004. It is noteworthy that the 
losses of adult animals reflect all causes of loss, including diseases. 
These mortality rates capture the heterogeneity of losses among the species and the geographic 
areas. Based on the 33 years and 324 soums, Table 3 presents some insights about the frequency 
of mortality rates (MR) by species. Cattle are more frequently exposed to minor losses (MR lower 
than 5%) and catastrophic losses (MR higher than 20%) than the other species. 
 
Table 3. Frequency of annual mortality rate, by species 
Morality rate Cattle Sheep Goat Horse Camel 
0% to 5% 72.9% 70.1% 71.7% 72.2% 64.0% 
5% to 7.5% 10.6% 14.3% 12.8% 12.6% 17.3% 
7.5% to 10% 4.9% 6.2% 5.8% 6.1% 8.4% 
10% to 20% 6.5% 6.9% 7.3% 6.3% 9.2% 
20% and more 5.2% 2.6% 2.5% 2.8% 1.1% 
Source: authors. 
 
The mortality rates also differ significantly by regions, as shown on Figure 4. They are higher in 
the southern regions of Mongolia, near the Gobi desert, and in north-west part of the country. 
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Figure 4. Average livestock mortality rate by soum: 2000-2002 
 
Note:  Average livestock mortality rates for all species (camels, horses, cattle, sheep, goats) over the period 
2000-2002. 
Source: authors. 
 
The mortality data present some unique problems in developing the underlying distribution 
function. Figure 5 illustrates the issue by presenting a frequency plot of mortality rates for cattle 
and yak from a sample soum. In this particular soum, there are five events out of the 33 years of 
data (1971-2004) with mortality rates in excess of 10 percent. Even though the maximum rate 
was 33 percent in this soum, there are many soums in the same aimag with mortality rates in 
excess of this level. The upper bound on mortality is still 100%. Distributions are heavily skewed 
to the right given the nature of this risk. Data in the upper ranges of mortality are rare. Sample 
size is quite limited to fit the range of events in the upper ranges of the data. There is ambiguity 
regarding what the probability of the upper range mortality rates actually are. There are no 
distribution fitting procedures that are likely to capture the underlying distribution of these risks. 
An alternative would be a mixed distribution, one distribution capturing non-catastrophic events 
(e.g., MR lower than 30 percent) and one distribution capturing catastrophic events. 
  
Figure 5. Historic frequency of mortality rate, cattle, sample soum  
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4. Designing a Livestock Insurance Program 
4.1. Index-based Livestock Insurance 
Attempts to develop individual livestock insurance in Mongolia have been unsuccessful in recent 
years. This traditional form of insurance, where indemnities are calculated for each insured 
farmer on the basis of individual claims, simply cannot work in Mongolia because (i) individual 
historic data are not available and thus insurer cannot have adequate information on individual 
herders, creating classic moral hazard and adverse selection problems, (ii) collection of individual 
data would necessitate tremendous equipment and personnel investments in the vast geographic 
area of Mongolia, and (iii) individual loss adjustments would be very costly or nearly impossible. 
An alternative approach is to develop a collective system for indemnifications: indemnity 
payments are based on an external index designed to reflect the loss incurred by the herders. Such 
schemes are known as index-based insurance. Area-yield insurance programs, where the index is 
the aggregate yield in a given geographical area, have been implemented in India, Mexico or 
Spain. Weather-based insurance contracts, where the index is based on some weather parameters 
(e.g., rainfall, temperature) have been investigated in numerous countries and implemented in 
Canada and in India. These schemes present some advantages (e.g., reduction of moral hazard 
and adverse selection, lower administrative costs), but their main impediment is the presence of 
basis risk, i.e., the imperfect correlation between the insurance indemnity and the individual loss. 
Weather-based insurance was considered as a first alternative to individual insurance because 
Mongolia has reasonable historical weather records to support the risk analysis. However, the 
infrastructure of the weather system is under-funded and has stations that are far apart, limiting 
the information needs required for weather-based insurance. Furthermore, winter dzuds are 
complex events, consisting of multiple weather phenomena over a period of time, and sometimes 
non-weather factors, making the classification of risk highly problematic.4
Skees and Enkh-Amgalan (2002) proposed to design an index-based insurance product that would 
indemnify herders based on the mortality rate of adult animals in a given area. The index-based 
livestock insurance (IBLI) would pay indemnities whenever the adult mortality rate exceeds a 
specific threshold for a localized region (e.g., the soum in Mongolia). It is simpler than weather-
based insurance, and is less prone to moral hazards, adverse selection, and high administrative 
costs of individual insurance. Importantly, this system provides strong incentives to individual 
herders to continue to manage their herds so as to minimize the impacts of major dzud events: if a 
better herder has no losses when their neighbors has large losses, the better herder is rewarded for 
the extra effort by receiving a payment based on the area losses. Finally, a 33 year time series on 
adult animal mortality is available for all soums and for the five major species of animals. Such 
data are critical for developing actuarial information and for understanding the potential cost of 
alternative designs. 
4.2. Layering Livestock Risk  
Previous government efforts to develop viable agricultural insurance programs in many 
developed countries and developing countries have been frustrated by the inherent lack of clarity 
regarding the objectives that range from social safety nets to commercial insurance. Governments 
have started to realize that these programs are no longer financially sustainable. For example, 
Government of India has recently decided to reform the current crop insurance scheme and to 
                                                          
4 Initial results showed a low correlation between livestock mortality rates and weather parameters (rainfall, 
minimum temperature, maximum temperature). However, options will be further considered for linking the 
index-based livestock insurance product to other indicators such as weather data and/or indices for range 
vegetation conditions (e.g. normalized, differentiated vegetation index – NDVI). 
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place it on an actuarial path.5  Such a sound financial and actuarial approach aims to introduce 
more discipline in the program and to transfer catastrophic losses to the international reinsurance 
market.  
The government may have limited comparative advantage to reduce risk, compared to the private 
insurance industry (Priest 1996). The risk aggregation function, through the law of large numbers, 
performs well with relatively small samples when individual risks are independent. In this 
context, the government’s size and scope is not required for the risk aggregation function to 
perform well. Insurers control adverse selection by segregating the individual risks. Low 
insurance premiums are offered to low-risk producers, while higher premiums are charged to 
high-risk producers as a signal of their true risk exposure. The insurance industry thus plays a 
central role in discovering the true cost of risk. However, segregation is often viewed as socially 
unacceptable because it does not meet some social and solidarity objectives. As a consequence, 
public insurance is likely to engage low efforts to control adverse selection through risk 
segregation and to offer some average premium to all parties. Under voluntary insurance, this 
absence of segregation leads to the death spiral of adverse selection. In this case, compulsory 
insurance may be viewed as a solution to adverse selection as it forces low-risk producers to stay 
in the insurance pool. However, this is not a risk reducing effect but a wealth redistribution effect 
from the low-risk agents, who over-pay their premiums, to the high-risk agents, who under-pay 
their premiums. The ex ante control of moral hazard is based on risk sharing through coinsurance 
and deductibles, and exclusions on insurance coverage. This limited coverage is usually 
inconsistent with the government’s willingness to offer farmers universal coverage against all 
sources of risk. As in the case of adverse selection, social objectives may prevent the government 
from controlling efficiently moral hazard problems. However, the government may have a 
comparative advantage in absorbing catastrophic losses that are beyond the financial capacity of 
the insurance industry.  This is because it is able to spread these losses across generations and to 
implement the solidarity principle through an appropriate wealth transfer mechanism. 
The dual goals of providing commercial insurance in the private insurance sector and social 
insurance in the public sector are addressed through the following layering of livestock risk (see 
Figure 6). 
• High frequency but low severity losses, occurring approximately once every five years or 
more frequently, are retained by the herders and managed through risk mitigation 
activities or individual capital (e.g., savings, credit). 
• Less frequent but more severe losses, occurring approximately once every 5 to 25 years, 
are financed by a commercial insurance product, Base Insurance Product (BIP). This 
product covers the mezzanine layer of risk. Herders pay premiums priced at commercial 
rates, i.e., including a risk (reserve) load and an administrative load. This product is sold 
on a voluntary basis. 
• Catastrophic losses, occurring approximately once every 25 years or more, are covered 
by a social safety-net product, Disaster Response Product (DRP). This social product 
complements the commercial product. The rationale for this top layer of risk is that the 
domestic insurance industry in Mongolia could not retain such catastrophic losses and 
could not transfer it out of the country because of the limited access to international 
reinsurance and capital markets.  
 
                                                          
5 The National Agriculture Insurance Scheme in India is the largest crop insurance program worldwide in 
terms of insured farmers, with approximately 17 million in 2006. 
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Figure 6. Livestock Risk Layering 
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Source: authors. 
 
BIP and DRP payments are based on the soum mortality rate, as reported by the National 
Statistical Office of the Government of Mongolia. The attachment point (strike) and the 
exhaustion point (cap) of the BIP are set according to the estimated return of period mentioned 
above. Therefore, the attachment points should vary from 7% to 10% depending on the species 
and the soums and the exhaustion points should vary from 25% to 30%. In the proposed insurance 
policy to be pilot tested, only one strike at 7% and two caps at 25 or 30% are offered to the 
herders for the sake of simplicity, but it is expected that at least two strikes (7% and 10%) will be 
proposed to the herders in the near future. Box 3 describes how BIP and DRP work. 
 
Box 3. How BIP and DRP work 
Herders pay a premium based on the value of their animals reported and the relative risk in the soum that 
they select. The soum is selected based on herder’s knowledge of where his/her animals are most exposed 
during the year. Herders are able to insure between 25 and 100 percent of the estimated value of their 
animals. Payments begin once the predetermined threshold of mortality for the soum (strike) and species is 
exceeded. The payment rate is capped once the mortality rate exceeds the exhaustion point (cap). BIP 
payments are the product of the payment rate times the value insured. Formally, the BIP indemnity 
schedule is 
[ ]{ }strikecapstrikeMRMRI BIP −−= ,0,maxmin xinsured) sum()( , where MR is the reported 
mortality rate. 
DRP payments use the full value of animals as the base of value insured. The DRP pays for losses beyond 
the exhaustion point. Formally, the DRP indemnity schedule is 
[ ]0,max xanimals) of value()( capMRMRI DRP −= . 
As an example, consider a herder who has 36 sheep where the value of a sheep is 28,320 Tg (US$1 is 
approximately equal to Tg 1200). The herder decides to insure the total value = 28,320 Tg. x 36 ~ 
1,000,000 Tg. The premium rate for the BIP, with a strike at 7% and a cap at 30%, is 1.4 %. The herder 
would pay 1.4 x .01 x 1,000,000 = 14,000 Tg as a premium. 
The mortality rate in the herder’s soum during a bad dzud year equals 35 %. Payment rate for the BIP is 
equal to 30% -7% = 23 %, and thus BIP are 23% x 1,000,000 Tg. = 230,000 Tg. Payment for the DRP 
equals (35%- 30%) x 1,000,000 Tg. = 50,000 Tg. 
In total, the herder thus receives payouts of 64,000 Tg. 
Source: Authors. 
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4.3. Livestock Insurance Indemnity Pool 
Despite this layering of livestock risk (i.e. that transfers the top layer to the government through a 
social insurance product), the domestic insurance industry in Mongolia is still exposed to 
significant losses through the commercial product BIP due to high spatial correlation of mortality 
for events in the 7% to 25% or 30% levels.  
The Mongolian insurance market is underdeveloped and the regulatory and supervisory body is 
not fully effective (see Box 4). A new Law on Insurance, enacted in April 2004, came into effect 
on 1st January 2005. However, the new Financial Regulatory Committee (FRC) is unlikely to be 
fully effective in the supervision of the insurance sector for some years. This is especially true in 
the case of a catastrophic insurance offering such as index-based livestock insurance. Therefore, 
it is unlikely that the FRC will be well positioned or prepared to regulate and supervise the IBLI 
product in the near future. As a consequence, it became necessary to devise a separate and 
possibly temporary arrangement to market the IBLI product. The proposed arrangement is based 
on a contractual agreement between the participating insurance companies and the Government of 
Mongolia under which the livestock insurance business is considered as a specific class of 
business and consequently managed with specific rules. The unique characteristics of this line of 
business compared to other lines of property insurance are twofold. First, IBLI is exposed to 
catastrophic risks, mainly caused by harsh winters (dzuds), and thus needs appropriate risk 
financing. Second, this new line of business is in a pilot stage, with all uncertainty associated with 
the launch of an innovative product. Early ring-fencing of the livestock business would thus 
protect it from excessive losses in other classes (the reverse issue is less relevant given the small 
initial volumes involved). A Livestock Insurance Indemnity Pool (LIIP) was accordingly 
established. The key objectives to be achieved through this annual insurance pool are the 
following: 
• Herders must receive in full the indemnity payments that are due – no default risk; 
• A simple and stable structure for implementation in the short run that allows for 
flexibility in the future; 
• Incentives for companies to sell the IBLI product; 
• The insurance industry is insulated from catastrophic livestock losses; 
• Incentives for companies to collaborate on the integrity of the system; 
• The foundation is consistent with a new regulatory environment. 
 
Box 4. Domestic insurance market in Mongolia 
The domestic insurance market is immature and undercapitalized. It was only opened to competition in the 
early 1990s, and the two state-owned insurance companies, Mongol Daatgal and Tushig were privatized in 
2004. As of December 2005, 24 insurance companies are licensed and offer non-life insurance only 
(personal accident, property and liability).  
The 2005 annual gross premium volume was US$5.3 million, of which 61 percent was for property 
insurance (including aircraft insurance of the Mongolian airline MIAT for 25 percent), 30 percent was for 
liability insurance (including aircraft liability insurance for 15 percent) and 9 percent was for personal 
accident and health insurance. The total premium of individual livestock insurance and crop insurance 
accounted for 0.5 percent of the gross premiums. 
In 2005, the net income premium (gross income minus reinsurance premiums paid) was US$3.1 million. 
The premium volume represents 0.44 percent of Mongolian GDP and US$2.3 per capita. As a comparison, 
the insurance penetration, as a percent of GDP, is 0.57% in Vietnam, 0.61% in Philippine, 1.03 % in China, 
and 2.13% in Russia. 
The domestic insurance market is highly concentrated with the largest company, Mongol Daatgal, having a 
market share of 74%, and the three largest companies capturing an 82% market share.  
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In non-life insurance, the combined ratio is a standard measure of profitability used in the industry and by 
supervisors. It represents the profits or losses made on insurance operations, without the help of other 
income (e.g., investments, real estate, capital gains). The ratio is the total of the loss ratio, which represents 
the percentage of the claims paid in comparison with gross premiums, and the expense ratio, which is the 
percentage of the general expenses in comparison to the gross premiums. Insurance companies will 
normally have a combined ratio of around 100%, meaning that they experience a technical break even.. 
However, other sources of income usually transform this loss into profit. A ratio of less than 100% allows 
the insurance company to have a technical profit in addition to the investment profit. The combined ratio 
for the Mongolian (non life) insurance companies was at 56%. While the expense ratio of 34 percent is 
comparable to those of insurance companies in most countries, the loss ratio is remarkably low. Such a low 
loss ratio may be due to over priced insurance policies and/or, more probably, by a low level of reported 
claims. 
Source: Authors, from Mongolian Insurance Supervisory Agency (2005) 
 
The syndicate pooling arrangement LIIP can be viewed as a joint venture established every year 
in which participating insurers subscribe capital. Insurance companies are given rights to sell the 
developed BIP product in exchange for their capital contributions. They are obligated to build up 
annual collective reserves into the LIIP at the beginning of the sales season. The GoM offers a 
stop loss reinsurance contract beyond the collective reserves, sold at an actuarially fair premium 
that is tied to the distribution of sales for each company.6 In the initial years, a stop loss 
reinsurance treaty at 105 percent of the insurance premium volume (excluding operating costs) is 
in place. Funding for losses beyond 105 comes from the reinsurance premiums and a contingent 
credit from the World Bank.  
In February of each sales season (starting in 2006), the participating insurance companies present 
a business plan with the expected sales by soum. They also deposit into the LIIP the guarantee 
indemnity contribution (GIC), which equates the insurer’s expected portfolio reinsurance cost 
plus 5% of its expected written premium volume. This contribution represents their capital 
investment into this insurance program. After the sales closing date, they will deposit into the 
LIIP the herders’ premium volume, out of which the LIIP will pay the reinsurance cost of the 
105% stop loss on the aggregate livestock losses. At the end of the insurance cycle, any surplus 
(in addition to the interest earnings) in the LIIP account will be distributed among the 
participating insurance companies based upon their premium volume brought to the pool. 
The reinsurance premiums paid by the insurance companies to the GoM are put into a special 
reserve fund, BIP reinsurance reserves, and will be only used to pay reinsurance indemnities. The 
reinsurance premium paid by the LIIP to the government, and deposited in the BIP reinsurance 
reserve, may be higher than the actuarially fair reinsurance premium of the IBLI portfolio 
because of the pooling effect. Therefore, the reinsurance premium may be higher than the 
expected reinsurance payout, allowing the government to build up reserves across time. 
The reinsurance agreement between the insurance pool and the government is designed to give 
the insurance industry time to find external capital on the reinsurance market. Although it is not 
expected that international reinsurers will offer such an unlimited coverage, they may offer a 
layer of reinsurance, e.g., between 105% and 200% of premiums, and thus the government’s stop 
                                                          
6 The Government should behave as a risk neutral decision maker as long as the cost of risk bearing is 
insignificant because it can be spread among a large number of taxpayers (Arrow and Lind, 1970). In the 
case of livestock insurance in Mongolia, this assumption may not hold as the Mongolian economy and the 
government fiscal revenue are negatively impacted by dzud events. However, during the pilot phase, 
excessive losses are financed by a World Bank contingent credit facility provided at a cost well below the 
market costs. This allows the Government to spread potential losses across time, thus reducing its aversion 
towards livestock mortality risk. 
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loss would only cover the losses exceeding this layer. Reinsurance companies may also be 
interested to take a share of the losses under the stop loss, e.g., through of a quota share 
agreement with participating insurance companies. Figure 7 depicts the risk financing 
arrangements for the BIP losses. 
 
Figure 7. The financing of BIP losses under the LIIP 
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Source: Authors. 
 
The LIIP is a unique syndicate pooling arrangement which has been designed to address the 
current constraints in the local insurance market in Mongolia: lack of capital of the domestic 
insurance industry, lack of access to the reinsurance market, weak regulatory and supervisory 
framework, and potential catastrophic livestock losses. It paves the way to the development of a 
more traditional pool where local insurers would build reserves over years to absorb moderate 
losses and transfer catastrophic losses to the reinsurance market to reduce the government’s fiscal 
exposure to livestock losses. 
While the collective action problem of high transaction costs and lack of trust plague many 
attempts to develop a pooling arrangement, these problems are largely linked to the legitimate 
concerns that an individual insurance company may have about the way that other insurance 
companies underwrite their risk. In this situation, all insurance companies are underwriting the 
same insurance contracts and each company is collecting premiums from herders that are based 
on the same underwriting and loss adjustment procedures. Companies deposit the risk-loaded 
premiums into the LIIP. Thus, the uniformity of the contracts and the risk pricing should greatly 
reduce the transaction costs of agreeing to participate in a pooling arrangement. This is an 
extremely important aspect of pooling an index insurance contract versus attempting to pool 
traditional insurance products that will undoubtedly be more heterogeneous.   
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4.4.  Government Fiscal Exposure  
The Government of Mongolia is double exposed to livestock risk under this livestock insurance 
program. First, it covers losses exceeding a specific threshold (e.g., 25-30% of livestock mortality 
rate) through the DRP. Second, it acts as a reinsurer of last resort for the insurance companies 
selling the BIP through a stop loss reinsurance treaty sold at a fair price to the LIIP. This double 
exposure calls for adequate financing in order to avoid an increase in the fiscal burden of the 
government.7
The proposed financing of the government’s potential losses relies on a combination of reserves 
and an World Bank contingent credit provided by the World Bank. The BIP reserve includes 
reinsurance premiums paid by participating insurers and eventually additional capital brought by 
the GoM. Once this reserve is depleted, the government will call the contingent credit facility. 
This facility can potentially provide the government with a lower cost capital relative to the 
accumulation of reserves, but the major disadvantage is that once disbursed this facility could 
exacerbate the debt burden of the country. The effectiveness of this facility would thus depend on 
the country’s post-disaster financial profile and more specifically on its post-disaster ability to 
service debt. A grace period of several years may allow the Government to recover an acceptable 
fiscal situation before starting to reimburse the contingent debt. 
The disbursement of the contingent loan would follow the following process. If the actual BIP 
losses are in excess of the LIIP reserve and the BIP reinsurance reserve and/or if DRP payments 
have to be made, then the contingent loan will be drawn down to cover these excess BIP losses 
and/or the DRP losses. 
 
5. Pilot Study 
Based on several technical criteria (e.g., geographical spread of risk, existing pastoral risk 
management programs), three aimags were selected for the pilot phase of this program: 
Bayankhongor, Uvs and Khentii (see Figure 8). The risk profiles are summarized in Annex 1. The 
value at risk, i.e., the total value of animals exposed to natural disasters, is estimated at $55 
million in Khentii, $43 million in Uvs and $33 million in Bayankhongor. The average annual 
loss, based on the losses over the last 33 years, is estimated at $3.2 million in Khentii, $1.5 
million in Uvs and $1.9 million in Bayankhongor. Given the catastrophic risk profile of the 
mortality rates cased by the occurrence of dzuds, the variability of the annual loss is high, 
particularly in Bayankhongor where the standard deviation is higher than the average. The 
average annual loss, in percentage of the value at risk, is estimated at 5.7 percent in Khentii, 4.7 
percent in Uvs and 5.6 percent in Bayankhongor. 
The historical morality rates are analyzed for the species at the aimag level to determine the 
relationship between species. A simple linear correlation is conducted for all pairs of species 
within each of the three aimags (see Table 4). They show positive correlations between the 
different species. Bankhongor has the most strongly correlated mortality rates. These coefficients 
of correlation are weaker in Khentii, particularly between sheep and cattle. 
                                                          
7 During the pilot phase, the Government may also have to provide ex post disaster relief in the area hit by 
a catastrophe and where livestock insurance is not offered. 
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Figure 8. Selected areas for the IBLI pilot program. 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
Table 4. Aimag correlation of mortality rates 
Aimag Species Cattle Sheep Horse Goat 
Bayankhongor Cattle 1.00
 Sheep 0.87 1.00
 Horse 0.92 0.83 1.00
 Goat 0.92 0.94 0.87 1.00
Khentii Cattle 1.00
 Sheep 0.35 1.00
 Horse 0.51 0.62 1.00
 Goat 0.91 0.94 0.87 1.00
Uvs Cattle 1.00
 Sheep 0.62 1.00
 Horse 0.86 0.66 1.00
 Goat 0.72 0.90 0.76 1.00
Source: Authors from AFSC (2004). 
 
The size of the animal population varies greatly between species within a soum. Limited data 
make mortality rates less credible, i.e., the mortality rates and their variability can be questioned. 
A potential consequence would be to provide over-payments or under-payments, thus increasing 
the potential dissatisfaction with the BIP program, either on the part of the insured herders or the 
private insurance providers. The limited credibility fluctuation approach is performed to identify 
the minimum number of animals under which the data are not credible and thus cannot be safely 
used to base payments on (see Box 5). A threshold of 3,000 animal heads was selected. A proxy 
is used for the soums having less than 3,000 animals of a specific species. Given this criterion, 
cattle are excluded in 17% of soums and horses are excluded in 19% of soums. This represents 
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only 6% of cattle and 11% of horses in all three aimags. Sheep morality rates are used as the 
proxy to make BIP and DRP payments when cattle and horses fall below 3,000 in any soum. 
 
Box 5. Data credibility 
The limited fluctuation credibility approach assumes that the random mortality for a particular 
soum-species follows a Poisson process in each year. We want to be sure that the observed 
mortality for a particular soum-species-year, M, is within c% of the true expected mortality, m, 
with probability (1-a)%: 
 [ ] amcMmc −=+≤≤− 1)1()1(Prob . 
Applying the central limit theorem, one can show that the expected mortality for soum-species-
year m has to be greater than 2cZa , where  is the (a/2)th percentile of the normal aZ
distribution. 
The average mortality for soum-species is 4.8% or above in 90% of soums. We would like to be 
very sure (99% sure) that the mortality rate estimate is within 1 percentage point of the true value, 
i.e., c=21% (=1%/0.048). Given a=1% and c=21%, we have .1512 =cZa  The minimum 
number of animals is thus 3,146=151/0.048, which is rounded at 3,000. 
The species in a soum with less than 3,000 animals are considered to have low data and thus 
cannot be used to make indemnity payments because of their low credibility. This threshold 
excludes cattle in 17 soums and horses in 19 soums, out of 57 soums. This represents 6% of cattle 
and 11% and horses in all three selected aimags. 
Source: Authors, from AFSC (2004). 
 
The premium rates of the BIP product are calculated for each of the 59 soums in the three pilot 
aimags and for each species (cattle, sheep, goats and horses). The steps in the ratemaking 
procedure are detailed in Box 6. The weighted average premium rates, and the minimum and 
maximum premiums rates, by aimag and species, are listed in Table 5. Bayankhongor is the 
riskier aimag in this mezzanine layer of risk, with average premium rates and the minimum and 
maximum rates higher than those in the other aimags, for all four species.  
 
Box 6. BIP ratemaking procedure 
The main steps in setting the premium rates for the BIP program are the following.  
First, the expected value of mortality rates exceeding 7% is computed for each soum-species.  
Second, each aimag is divided into 3 risk zones using a pure premium rate for the commingled 
species (i.e., the soum of all deaths of all species divided by the soum of all animals for all 
species).  
Third, the expected BIP payoff, i.e., mortality rates between 7% and 25%-30%, is computed for 
soum-species and zone-species.  
Fourth, as a means of smoothing the premium rates out within a risk zone, the pure premium for a 
soum-species is then defined as the simple average between the expected BIP payoff for the 
soum-species and the expected BIP payoff for the zone-species, with the corresponding zone of 
the given soum. 
Fifth, in order to account for the most extreme events in the region, a catastrophe load is added to 
the above pure premium. This catastrophe load is the simple average between the expected DRP 
payoff for the zone-species and the expected DRP payoff for the aimag-species, with the 
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corresponding aimag of a given zone. These values are simply added to the premium rates that 
come from step 4.  
Finally, the smoothed premium (equal to the pure premium from step 4 plus the catastrophe load) 
is weighted by a scale factor, determined at the aimag level, such that the reinsurance premium 
rate is roughly identical in all three aimags (about 38%). This last step aims to prevent 
participating insurance companies from targeting herders only located in the aimag with the 
lowest reinsurance cost. 
Source: Authors. 
 
Table 5. BIP risk-loaded premium rates, weighted average by aimag 
 Goat Horse Sheep Cattle 
Uvs   
  Average 1.05% 1.50% 0.83% 1.50%
  Min 0.62% 0.50% 0.50% 0.68%
  Max 1.86% 3.22% 1.98% 2.48%
Bayankhongor  
  Average 2.33% 2.24% 2.59% 2.46%
  Min 1.64% 1.50% 1.84% 2.07%
  Max 2.76% 2.88% 2.99% 3.57%
Khentii  
  Average 1.20% 0.94% 1.07% 1.69%
  Min 0.85% 0.55% 0.76% 1.20%
  Max 1.74% 1.96% 1.53% 2.18%
Source: authors. 
 
The livestock loss exposure of the participating insurance companies is estimated under the 
following assumptions. Four insurance companies sell the IBLI product in the three pilot aimags 
and the total livestock insurance penetration rate is assumed to be 10 percent. Three of them are 
concentrated in each of the three pilot aimags, with a penetration rate of 4 percent in each soum 
and each species. The fourth insurance company dominates the market and has a diversified 
portfolio with a penetration rate of 6 percent in the three aimags for all species. This roughly 
replicates the current insurance market shares in Mongolia. 
Herders 
Under such assumptions, historical data show that the probability of getting BIP payments in any 
given year is equal to 94% in Bayankhongor, 85% in Khentii and 70% in Uvs. The probability of 
receiving BIP payments higher than 10% of the risk-loaded premium is estimated at 61% in 
Bahnakhongor, 42% in Khentii and 27% in Uvs. Thus, there is a significant chance that some 
herders will get paid within the first year of implementation; such early payments would 
contribute to the credibility of the insurance program. 
Herders subscribing only the DRP program have a lower probability of receiving any payments, 
as this program covers only extreme losses. The probability that DRP payments will be made in 
the pilot aimags in any given year is estimated at 30%. 
Insurance industry 
Under the assumption of 10% signup rates for BIP, the total premium volume (excluding 
operating costs) would be around $215,000. Since the reinsurance stop loss is 105 of total 
premium in the first year of implementation, the LIIP reserve would be about $276,000. The 
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reinsurance premium rate is equal to 40% for the non-diversified portfolio, i.e., companies A, B 
and C, and 32% for the diversified portfolio of company D. The diversification effect thus allows 
company D to reduce the cost of reinsurance by 8 percentage points. This gives a strong incentive 
to participating insurers to bring a diversified portfolio of business to the pool.8 Total reinsurance 
costs for the stop loss at 105 percent would be close to $50,000 (see Annex 2). 
The average annual BIP loss paid by the LIIP is estimated at $133,000. The LIIP reserve would 
be fully depleted in about once every seven years (15%). The return on capital (ROC), including 
interest earnings at 13%, of the participating insurance companies would be high to reward the 
high risk exposure. The average ROC would be equal to 72-73% for the non-diversified 
companies and 119% for the diversified company. The insurance companies would lose their 
initial contribution about once every 4 years (24%).9 Non-diversified companies would have a 
58% chance of making 100% profit or more. This goes up to 62% for the diversified company 
(see Annex 2). 
Government 
The Government plays a key role in the proposed index-based livestock insurance program. First, 
it retains catastrophic livestock losses for all DRP signup when the mortality rates exceed a pre-
defined threshold (25% mortality rate in Khentii and 30% mortality rate for Uvs and 
Bahnakhongor). This social device protects herders against extreme losses. Second, it acts as a 
reinsurer of last resort, providing an actuarially fair stop loss to the insurance pool when the LIIP 
reserves are exhausted. 
The BIP reinsurance reserve (equal to the reinsurance premium volume) would be about $50,000. 
As long as no large livestock losses occur, a BIP reinsurance reserve will be built up over time, 
increasing the financial capacity of the government to absorb large livestock losses. However, 
there would be a 20% chance that this reserve is not sufficient to cover all BIP reinsurance 
indemnities the first year of implementation (see Annex 3). 
The special account, set up to fund the World Bank contingent credit facility, would be used to 
finance BIP losses in excess of the BIP reinsurance reserve and any DRP payments that the GoM 
is not able to finance through budget reallocation. Under these assumptions, the special account 
would be used about once every 4 years (28%). There would be a 16% chance that the payments 
from this account exceed US$0.5 million, a 8% chance that the payments exceed US$1 million 
and a 2% chance that payments are higher than US$2 million (see Annex 3).  
For this pilot and the assumptions regarding participation, the occurrence of three consecutive 
dzuds as those observed in 2000, 2001 and 2002 would cost to the government about $3.8 million 
(see Annex 3). Given such estimates, the US$5 million contingent credit should be sufficient for 
financing losses from both the BIP and the DRP during the three year life of the pilot.   
6. Implementing and Operating the Pilot Project: Challenges 
As this project is innovative and untested, there are potential problems that have influenced the 
design of the pilot. The special structure to ring-fence other lines of insurance from BIP losses 
and to finance extreme losses have been addressed. Other concerns include statistics used to 
measure livestock mortality, basis risk for individual herders, lack of education and knowledge 
about index insurance among herders, and the potential for fraud in the countryside. 
                                                          
8 However, the optimal strategy will be based on the tradeoff between the costs of setting up a delivery 
network in the aimags and the diversification gains. 
9 Even in those years, they will still make interest earnings on both their initial contribution and the herders’ 
premium fraction that remains in the LIIP. 
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6.1. Statistics Used to Measure Livestock Mortality 
The GoM has been conducting an annual census of animals in Mongolia for well over 50 years. 
The procedures are well-established and have numerous laws that attempt to protect the integrity 
of the process. Nonetheless, there are potential problems with these data once an insurance 
product is developed to pay based on the mortality rates. Considerable effort was made to 
understand the data process during the development of the pilot. It was learned that 
approximately 90 percent of the losses occur while herders are in their winter camps. Even 
though herders move their animals and can cross soum boundaries, it was also learned that where 
they have their winter camp is the designated soum in the census. Herders typically have a pattern 
of keeping their animals in the same camps by season. Local government leaders know the 
families and know their animals. These experts are used to assist in counting and reporting 
problems. New systems to track the same families will be developed at the National Statistics 
Office (NSO). 
To assure a timely payment, a new animal census will be conducted during the pilot stage during 
the month of May.  Mortality rates of adult animals will be based on the Census at the end of 
December and the May Census. There are very few animals slaughtered during this period. Thus, 
this statistic should reflect actual mortality better than numbers that would extend into the heavy 
slaughtering periods. During the pilot, the traditional methods of reporting mortality and a sample 
survey will be used to monitor any emerging problems. Additionally, a special technical 
assistance program is to be provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture Statistics Service. 
This assistance will be targeted at a lower cost and more accurate procedure that will use sample 
survey techniques. At the end of the pilot, an evaluation will be made about the sustainability and 
reliability of alternative methods for estimating mortality rates.  
6.2. Basis Risk for Individual Herders 
Basis risk will be an issue for some herders. Undoubtedly some herders will have losses when the 
mortality rate does not trigger a payment. To the extent that these losses are not severe when the 
insured herder does not get a payment or receives too little payment from the BIP or the DRP, the 
concept of self-retention is still important. However, there are potential problems if there are large 
losses. Other risk coping mechanisms need to be enhanced. Given that index insurance should 
take the major risk out of the system, it can also allow groups of herders to share risk in more 
creative ways. The project will attempt to link the index insurance to microfinance and to herder 
self-help groups that could facilitate informal risk sharing mechanisms within the group. 
A relatively straightforward examination of the data confirms that the spatial relationships among 
contiguous soums are relatively high.  The three worst years in recent history, 2000, 2001 and 
2002 for three aimags, Khentii, Bayankhongor, and Uvs were examined to make this 
determination. The average mortality rate for each species for each aimag was calculated from 
the soum mortality rates for a given year. Then the deviation from the mean was calculated for 
each soum as follows:  
Deviation by soum = (Soum mortality rate - average aimag mortality rate) 
Positive values indicate above average mortality rates for that soum, while negative values 
indicate below average mortality rates. These values were then mapped to get a visual 
representation of the geographic distribution of livestock deaths by species and soum. While there 
will be always be variation at the local level, the images indicate that the severity of the disaster is 
graduated, meaning the highest mortality rates are concentrated in several soums and decrease as 
you move further from that area. Though the index will be based on soum-level losses, the 
graduation of losses across soums indicates an event where there are correlated losses. This also is 
likely to be true within the soum. The higher the correlation of losses across an area, the more the 
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index will match the loss experience of individual herders.  Since sheep are the major species, the 
2001 map for sheep is presented on Figure 9. 
Figure 9. Soum deviations from Aimag average for sheep in 2001 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
6.3. Lack of Education and Knowledge about Index-based Insurance among Herders 
The pilot program has a strong outreach component to inform herders about the attributes of the 
index insurance product. Software that gives the historic payouts by species will be used to give 
the herders a clear indication of how the bad years match their losses. Focus groups with herders 
have already been conducted in every soum in the pilot aimags. These types of activities will be 
repeated to learn of herder concerns and to help shape the educational material used. Radio 
campaigns, local presentations, newsletters, press releases and a wide array of other activities are 
planned.  
Beyond the educational efforts, monitoring and evaluation efforts will be conducted throughout 
the pilot program to learn how well herders understand the products and to learn if informal and 
formal risk sharing mechanisms are being developed to complement the index insurance. Another 
critical item to be investigated is the extent to which the index insurance products change the 
lending behavior of formal and informal lenders in the pilot areas.  
6.4. Potential for Fraud in the Countryside 
This pilot project represents the first effort to organize sales of insurance in some of the pilot area. 
The potential for fraud or even unintentional mistakes is significant. Every effort has been made 
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to mitigate these problems. Sales agents must undergo training and become certified before being 
approved to sell BIP. Once certified, agents will be issued a perforating stamp with a unique 
identification number and a set of numbered sales sheets. For each transaction multiple sales 
sheets will be perforated with the unique identification stamp. Redundant systems are in place to 
validate the sales. Herders will also have the opportunity to validate the sales at the local 
government level in the fall well before any losses occur.  All of these systems have been 
organized to minimize the likelihood that any herder will present a sales sheet at the time of the 
loss and discover that they are not entered into the record in a proper fashion. Insurance 
companies have every incentive to maintain the integrity of the system as they will be responsible 
for any herder losses that occur outside the documented record of sales. Such exposure would 
also be outside the LIIP and the GoM stop loss system. In addition to the detail for the individual 
sales, redundant systems will be created in tracking all sales and paying all losses. The LIIP itself 
assures that herder premiums are completely protected until time of settlement. 
7. Experience to Date 
The first sales season took place from April 1 to July 10, 2006, with insurance policies protecting 
against losses in the first five months of 2007. Three insurance companies were involved in the 
sales with 142 certified insurance agents operating in all 56 soums. Sales were greater than 
expected in numbers with around 9 percent of herders purchasing the BIP in the three pilot 
regions. The total premium volume (excluding administrative costs) exceeded US$78,000. Just 
over 2,200 herders purchased the commercial BIP product and 200 herders enrolled in only the 
social DRP product. Nearly 300,000 animals were insured under the project, which represents 
about 7 percent of the animals in the three pilot regions. Herders with herd size smaller than 
average were the primary purchasers of the IBLI insurance products. 
 
Most herders purchased the lowest level of coverage (30 percent of the value of their animals). In 
the second year of pilot implementation, herders will be able to select either a 6 percent or a 10 
percent mortality threshold for the BIP. The educational efforts are trying to encourage the 
herders to consider the 10 percent threshold with a higher value of insurance as a better risk 
management strategy to protect against the most severe losses.  
 
Participating insurance companies were allowed to charge an operating load beyond the risk-
loaded premiums. These loads averaged around 25 percent of the risk-loaded premiums. 
Insurance companies indicated that these loads may be raised in the second year. 
 
However, as expected, the first sales season of the pilot program revealed some areas where 
adjustments were needed. In addition, herders and participating insurance companies brought 
forth concerns and recommendations for the pilot program. The types of issues raised highlight 
the need for very thorough and clear education of stakeholders. Misunderstandings and confusion 
about the IBLI program can lead to its demise. Herders must have a clear understanding about the 
terms and conditions of the BIP and DRP contracts.  Insurance companies must have confidence 
in the calculation of indemnities. Transparency of information is an important aspect of this. 
Likewise, insurance agents and local staff must have a solid understanding of the program to 
convey the details to the herders and to ensure that the program operates the way it is designed. 
 
The case for linking index insurance to lending was made to lenders in Mongolia (Skees and 
Barnett 2006). As a result, the three major lenders agreed to lower interest rates for herders 
purchasing the BIP insurance. In some cases, they are also willing to lend more to herders who 
have BIP insurance. On average the rates were lowered by 1.2 percentage points annually. 
Furthermore, herders who have the BIP insurance can obtain these preferential interest rates 
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anytime during the period they are insured by BIP.  Additionally, it is anticipated that access to 
credit will improve given this form of insurance. 
 
An extensive educational and promotion effort was undertaken in the first year of the project. 
Face-to-face education took place with 95 percent of the herders (over 27,000 herders).  Although 
the face-to-face education made a significant contribution to the herders understanding of the 
IBLI product, some confusion on the understanding of the ‘losses’ to be covered under the IBLI 
scheme remained. As part of the monitoring and evaluation of the project, some 670 people were 
interviewed in focus group discussions. Over 85 percent of the herders indicated that they had 
received IBLI information. Of the herders interviewed, about 15 percent had purchased the BIP. 
Over half of these herders like the idea that they would be paid during the difficult dzud event 
even without proving they had any losses.   
 
Despite the significant educational efforts which included some strong information about the 
careful considerations to assure payments, a number of herders continued to be influenced by the 
past negative experience where livestock insurance did not pay for losses during the most difficult 
times. These views appear to have influenced the purchase decision. It is likely that these views 
would change if there are some losses paid during the pilot project.   
 
8. Conclusion 
Government of Mongolia requested specific assistance from the World Bank in coping with 
extreme livestock losses.  This paper gives the background and details for a pilot program that 
will test index-based livestock insurance.  A credit of US$9.44 million was approved in May 
2005.  This loan includes both technical assistance to run a three year pilot program in three 
aimags in Mongolia and a US$5 million contingent debt facility to serve as a mechanism for 
protecting the government against extreme losses during the pilot.  The proposed pilot involves 
three distinct layers of risk: self retention by the herders for low livestock mortality rates; 
commercial base insurance product for intermediate livestock mortality rates; and safety-net 
disaster response product for high livestock mortality rates, i.e., beyond the layer covered by the 
BIP. 
An index-based insurance program was recommended because of significant concerns about 
moral hazard, adverse selection, and extreme monitoring costs associated with any individual 
livestock insurance program in the vast open spaces of Mongolia.  While it is believed that the 
index-insurance product can be effectively underwritten, significant financial exposure for a 
nascent insurance market that has extremely limited access to global risk shifting markets remains 
among the largest challenges.  Given concerns about financing extreme losses, the pilot design 
involves a syndicate pooling arrangement for insurance companies.  This pool ring fences this 
line of business and thus protects the domestic insurance market against any catastrophic 
livestock losses.  The government offers an unlimited stop loss on the pooled risk of the insurance 
companies.   
In the syndicated pooling arrangement, participants share underwriting gains and losses based 
upon the share of herder premium they bring into the pool.  Each insurer also pays reinsurance 
costs that are consistent with the book of business they bring into the pool.  This gives the 
reinsurance pool the benefits of the pooling arrangement and provides the opportunity to build 
reserves for the overall program.  The BIP reinsurance reserves pay for the first layer of losses 
beyond the stop loss.  Once the BIP reinsurance reserves are exhausted, the government can call 
upon the contingent credit to pay for any remaining losses.  
A major advantage of having a prepaid indemnity pool is that all other lines of insurance business 
are protected from the extreme losses that can occur from writing an agricultural risk that is 
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highly correlated.  In addition, the pooling mechanism allows participating companies to spread 
their risk among all insurers involved in the sale of the BIP product.  Given that BIP is a standard 
product that involves the same premium rates from all companies, the issue of trust and due 
diligence of the underwriting skills of participating insurers is greatly reduced.  This is important 
as typical pooling arrangements among insurance companies are generally very difficult to 
organize given the high transaction costs needed to perform due-diligence on underwriting skills 
of the participating insurers.  The longer term vision is that the pooling mechanism created in the 
pilot can be well positioned to find risk-sharing partners in the global community quickly as the 
pooling arrangement is both risky and profitable.  Reinsurers might be willing to provide capital 
and enter quota-share arrangements on that risk. To the extent that the risks within the pool are 
standardized, using the same measures and procedures, one can also envision this mechanism 
serving as a means to securitize the risk.  Finally, the design also offers the opportunity to 
transition the system to the market once it is learned whether herders find the BIP an acceptable 
product and demonstrate a willingness to pay. 
This lending operation, which offers the opportunity to design and implement a country-wide 
agriculture insurance program, paves the way to the development of financially sustainable 
agriculture insurance programs offering affordable and effective insurance coverage while 
limiting the fiscal exposure of the government. 
As of May 2006, the pilot program was moving forward with three insurance companies 
approved for sales.  The sales season started late April and was to end early July.  The design of 
the program is being effectively implemented. Companies were required to submit a strategic 
plan using specially developed portfolio software. This allowed the companies to evaluate the 
tradeoffs between their administrative cost and the cost of reinsurance. Administrative cost 
increase as companies attempt to expand their reach into the entire market. Reinsurance cost 
decline as companies spread their risk over the market. Companies made rational choices. In the 
initial plans some 90 percent of the market is covered. A few soums were excluded from 
company plans. In particular, some large soums with a low number of animals were excluded. A 
challenge from the government steering committee was that there should be universal coverage of 
the product. Here again, the presence of two products, the market-based BIP product and the 
social-based DRP product, provided some counterbalance to the argument that companies should 
be selling index-based livestock insurance everywhere. An extensive promotion and public 
awareness campaign is being planned.  At this stage, it is uncertain how herders will respond to 
these new insurance products.  Two banks are offering lower interest rates and/or longer loan 
terms for herders purchasing the BIP product. 
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Annex 1. Risk profile of the three pilot aimags 
 
Bayankhongor 
 
 CATTLE SHEEP GOAT HORSE TOTAL 
Total no. of animals 95,791 425,299 607,366 70,268 1,198,724
Total value of animals  $8,621,190  $10,845,125  $8,199,441  $5,797,110  $33,462,866 
Average AL  $494,434  $626,667  $425,628  $326,101  $1,872,829 
Standard Dev. AL $1,072,979 $854,178 $710,870 $1,126,159 $2,387,391
Average AL (%) 5.7 5.8 5.2 5.6 5.6 
 
 
Khentii 
 
 CATTLE SHEEP GOAT HORSE TOTAL 
Total no. of animals 147,046 646,048 396,054 172,161 1,361,309
Total value of animals  $22,056,900  $16,151,200  $6,336,864  $10,760,063  $55,305,027 
Average AL  $1,341,429  $903,933  $359,319  $569,370  $3,174,051 
Standard Dev. AL  $1,185,466 $706,834 $305,498 $507,722  $1,818,618 
Average AL (%) 6.1 5.6 5.7 5.3 5.7
 
 
Uvs 
 
 CATTLE SHEEP GOAT HORSE TOTAL 
Total no. of animals 86,796 792,870 563,828 63,743 1,507,237
Total value of animals  $9,547,560  $19,028,880  $7,893,592  $7,330,445  $43,800,477 
Average AL  $529,740 $775,002  $345,186  $404,539  $2,054,467 
Standard Dev. AL  $686,184.08  $1,094,947  $415,744  $513,609 $1,464,185
Average AL (%) 5.5 4.1 4.4 5.5 4.7 
 
AL: annual loss 
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Annex 2. Livestock risk exposure of the insurance industry 
Insurance penetration (assumption) 
 Uvs Bayankhongor  Khentii 
Company A 4% 0% 0%
Company B 0% 4% 0%
Company C 0% 0% 4%
Company D 6% 6% 6%
Total 10% 10% 10%
Livestock Insurance Indemnity Pool  
Premium volume US$215,000
Reserves US$276,000
Reinsurance cost US$50,000
Estimates. 
LIIP Reserve (excluding financial gains from interest earnings) 
 
Average US$133,000
Coefficient of variation 64%
Prob[LIIP fully depleted] 15%
Estimates. 
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Return on capital (ROC) of the participating insurance companies (including interest 
earnings @13%) 
 Company A Company B Company C Company D
Average  72% 72% 73% 119%
Standard deviation 91% 91% 91% 116%
median 113% 113% 113% 170%
Prob(ROC<0%) 24% 24% 24% 24%
Prob(ROC>100%) 58% 58% 58% 62%
 
 
Return on Capital - Diversified book of business
Exceedance probability curve
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
-100% -50% 0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300%
Ex
ce
ed
an
ce
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33
Annex 3. Livestock risk exposure of the Government 
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Participation: BIP 10%, DRP 30%. 
Reinsurance premiums: $ 69,000 
 
 
Government position 
 Loss
Average AL $96,000
Coefficient of Variation 433%0
Prob[loss>0] 20%
Estimates. 
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